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Abstract—We introduce an attack against encrypted web
traffic passing over the first hop – between client and Tor gateway
– of the Tor network. The attack makes use only of packet timing
information on the uplink and so is impervious to packet padding
defences. In addition, we show that the attack is robust against the
randomised routing used in Tor. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of the attack at identifying the web sites being visited by a Tor
user, achieving mean success rates of 68%. As well as being of
interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to highlight
deficiencies in existing defences and so to areas where it would be
beneficial for Tor and VPN designers to focus further attention.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider an attacker of the type illustrated
in Figure 1. The attacker can detect the time of packets
traversing the first hop encrypted tunnel between the client
and the Tor network, but has no other information about
the clients activity. The attacker’s objective is to use this
information to guess, with high probability of success, the
web sites which the client visits. What is distinctive about
the attack considered here is that attacker relies solely on
packet timestamp information whereas previously reported
attacks against encrypted web traffic have mainly made use of
observations of packet size and/or packet count information.
This attack directly targets one of the primary objectives of
the Tor network, namely to ensure unlinkability between users
and the servers which they visit. In contrast to correlation-
based attacks, which seek to correlate packet timings across
hops of the Tor network and require a strong adversary with a
broad view of the network spanning many hops, our attack
requires only access to the first network hop and so can
potentially be employed by a considerably weaker adversary.
Our interest in timing-only attacks against the first hop is
twofold. Firstly, packet padding is a relatively straightforward
defence against attacks that rely primarily on packet size.
Secondly, alternative attacks based on packet counting [2],
[3] are insensitive to packet padding defences but require
partitioning of a packet stream into individual web fetches
in order for the number of packets associated with each web
fetch to be determined, which may be highly challenging in
practice on links where there are no clear pauses between
web fetches. In contrast, packet timing-based attacks are not
only largely unaffected by packet padding defences but also
do not rely upon partitioning of the packet stream. Hence,
they are potentially a practically important class of attack
against Tor (and indeed other VPNs). While some work
has been carried out using inter-arrival time information to
classify the application (HTTP, IMAP etc) [6], to the best
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Fig. 1: Schematic illustrating attacker of the type considered.
A client machine is connected to the Internet via Tor. The
attacker can detect the time when packets traverse the first
hop encrypted tunnel, but has no other information.
of our knowledge there is no previous work reporting the
use of timing information alone to construct a successful
classification attack against encrypted web traffic.
The main contributions of this paper as as follows: (i) we
describe an attack against encrypted web traffic that uses
packet timing information alone, (ii) we demonstrate that
this attack is effective against clients using the Tor network,
achieving mean success rates of 68%, (iii) we also demonstrate
that the attack is effective against traffic streams i.e. back to
back web page fetches where the packet boundaries between
fetches are unknown.
A. Related Work
The general topic of traffic analysis has been the subject of
much interest, and a large body of literature exists. Some of
the earliest work specifically focussed on attacks and defences
for encrypted web traffic appears to be that of Hintz [5], which
considers the SafeWeb encrypting proxy. In this setup (i) web
page fetches occur sequentially with the start and end of each
web page fetch known, and for each packet (ii) the client-
side port number, (iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing) and
(iv) the size is observed. A web page signature is constructed
consisting of the aggregate bytes received on each port (cal-
culated by summing packet sizes), effectively corresponding
to the number and size of each object within the web page.
In [12] it is similarly assumed that the number and size of
the objects in a web page can be observed and using this
information a classification success rate of 75% is reported.
Subsequently, Bissias et al [1] considered an encrypted
tunnel setup where (i) web page fetches occur sequentially
with the start and end of each web page fetch known, and for
each packet (ii) the size, (iii) the direction (incoming/outgoing)
and (iv) the time (and so also the packet ordering) is observed.
The sequence of packet inter-arrival times and packet sizes
from a web page fetch is used to create a profile for each
web page in a target set and the cross correlation between an
observed traffic sequence and the stored profiles is then used
2as a measure of similarity. A classification accuracy of 23%
is observed when using a set of 100 web pages, rising to 40%
when restricted to a smaller set of web pages.
Most later work has adopted essentially the same model as
[1], making use of packet direction and size information and
assuming that the packet stream has already been partitioned
into individual web page fetches. In [8], [4] Bayes classifiers
based on the direction and size of packets are considered
while in [11] an SVM classifier is proposed. In [9] classifi-
cation based on direction and size of packets is studied using
Levenshtein distance as the similarity metric, in [10] using
a Gaussian Bag-of-Words approach and in [13] using KNN
classification. In [2] using a SVM approach a classification
accuracy of over 80% is reported for both SSH and Tor
traffic and the defences considered were generally found to be
ineffective. Similarly, [3] considers Bayes and SVM classifiers
and finds that a range of proposed defences are ineffective.
II. ANATOMY OF A WEB PAGE FETCH
When traffic is carried over an encrypted tunnel the packet
source/destination addresses/ports and the payload are hidden.
We also assume here that the tunnel pads the packets to be of
equal size, so that packet size information is also concealed,
and that the start and end of an individual web fetch may also
be concealed e.g. when the web fetch is embedded in a larger
traffic stream. An attacker sniffing traffic on the encrypted tun-
nel is therefore able only to observe the direction and timing of
packets though the tunnel, i.e. to observe a sequence of pairs
{(tk, dk)}, k = 1, 2, · · · where tk is the time at which the k’th
packet is observed and dk ∈ {−1, 1} indicates whether the
packet is travelling in the uplink/downlink direction. Since it
will be sufficient to mount an effective attack, we will assume
a weaker attacker that can only observe the timestamps {tk},
k ∈ Kup := {κ ∈ {1, 2, · · · } : dκ = −1} of uplink traffic .
Figure 2 plots the timestamps {tk} of the uplink packets sent
during the course of fetching five different health-related web
pages (see below for details of the measurement setup). The x-
axis indicates the packet number k within the stream and the y-
axis the corresponding timestamp tk in seconds. It can be seen
that these timestamp traces are distinctly different for each web
site, and it is this observation that motivates interest in whether
timing analysis may by itself (without additional information
such as packet size, uplink/downlink packet ordering etc) be
sufficient to successfully de-anomymise encrypted web traffic.
To gain insight into the differences between the packet
timestamp sequences in Figure 2 and, importantly, whether
they are genuinely related to characteristics of each web page
rather than to other factors, it is helpful to consider the process
of fetching a web page in more detail. To fetch a web page
the client browser starts by opening a TCP connection with
the server indicated by the URL and issues an HTTP GET or
POST request to which the server then replies. As the client
parses the server response it issues additional GET/POST
requests to fetch embedded objects (images, css, scripts etc).
These additional requests may be to different servers from the
original request (e.g. when the object to be fetched is an advert
or is hosted in a separate content-delivery network), in which
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Fig. 2: Time traces of uplink traffic from 5 different Irish
healthcare websites are shown. It can be seen that the website
time traces exhibit distinct patterns. The traces are shifted
vertically to avoid overlap and facilitate comparison.
case the client opens a TCP connection to each new server
in order to issue the requests. Fetching of these objects may
in turn trigger the fetching of further objects. We make the
following more detailed observations:
1) Connection to third-party servers. Fetching an object
located on a third-party server requires the opening of a
new TCP connection to that server, over which the HTTP
request is then sent. The TCP connection handshake
introduces a delay (of at least one RTT) and since the
pattern of these delays is related to the web page content
it can potentially assist in identifying the web page.
2) Pipelining of requests. Multiple objects located on the
same server lead to several GET/POST requests being
sent to that server, one after another. Due to the dynamics
of TCP congestion control, this burst of back-to-back
requests can affect the timing of the response packets
in a predictable manner that once again can potentially
assist in identifying the web page.
3) Asynchronous requests. Dynamic content, e.g. pre-
fetching via AJAX, can lead to update requests to a server
with large inter-arrival times that can potentially act as a
web page signature.
4) Connection closing. When a web page fetch is com-
pleted, the associated TCP connections are closed. A
FIN/FINACK/ACK exchange closes each connection and
this burst of packets can have quite distinctive timing
which allows it to be identified. Since the number of
connections is related to the number of distinct locations
where objects in the web page are stored, it changes
between web pages.
Our aim is to use timing features such as these, which vary
depending upon the web page fetched, to create a timing
signature which allows us to identify which web page is being
fetched based on timing data only.
III. COMPARING SEQUENCES OF PACKET TIMESTAMPS
Suppose we have two sequences of packet timestamps t :=
{ti}, i = 1, 2, · · · , n and t′ := {t′j}, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m. Note
3that the sequence lengths n and m are not assumed to be the
same. To proceed we need to define an appropriate measure
of the distance between such sequences.
A. Derivative Dynamic Time Warping
Our interest is in a measure of the distance between packet
sequences which is insensitive to the types of distortion intro-
duced by the Tor network, so that the distance between packet
streams t and t′ associated with fetches of the same web page
at different times is measured as being small, and ideally the
distance between fetches of different web pages is measured
to be large. To this end we use a variant of Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) [7]. DTW aims to be insensitive to differences
between sequences which are due to stretching/compressing of
time and so can be expected to at least partly accommodate
the effects of changes in routing (Tor randomly reroutes traffic
periodically to make linking attacks harder) and in download
rate, queueing delay etc (which can be expected to change not
only under re-routing but also due to changes over time in the
traffic sharing a path).
We define a warping path p to be a sequence of pairs,
{(pik, p
j
k)}, k = 1, 2, · · · , l with (pik, p
j
k) ∈ V := {1, · · · , n}×
{1, · · · ,m} satisfying boundary conditions pi1 = 1 = p
j
1,
pil = n, p
j
l = m and step-wise constraints (pik+1, p
j
k+1) ∈
V
pi
k
,p
j
k
:= {(u, v) : u ∈ {pik, p
i
k + 1} ∩ {1, . . . , n}, v ∈
{pjk, p
j
k+1}∩{1, . . . , n}}, k = 1, · · · , l−1. That is, a warping
path maps points from one timestamp sequence to another
such that the start and end points of the sequences match (due
to the boundary conditions) and the points are monotonically
increasing (due to the step-wise constraints). This is illustrated
schematically in Figure 3, where the two timestamp sequences
to be compared are indicated to the left and above the matrix
and the bold line indicates an example warping path.
Let P lmn ⊂ V l denote the set of all warping paths of
length l associated with two timestamp sequences of length
n and m respectively, and let Ct,t′(·) : P lmn → R be a
cost function so that Ct,t′(p) is the cost of warping path
p ∈ P lmn. Our interest is in the minimum cost warping path,
p∗(t, t′) ∈ argminp∈P lmn Ct,t′(p). In DTW the cost function
has the separable form Ct,t′(p) =
∑l
k=1 ct,t′(p
i
k, p
j
k) where
ct,t′ : V → R, in which case optimal path p∗(t, t′) be
efficiently found using the backward recursion,
(pik, p
j
k) ∈ arg min
(pi,pj)∈Vk
Ck+1 + ct,t′(p
i, pj) (1)
Ck = Ck+1 + ct,t′(p
i
k, p
j
k) (2)
where Vk = (pi, pj) ∈ {(u, v) : (pik+1, p
j
k+1) ∈ Vu,v}, k =
l − 1, l − 2, · · · and initial condition Cl = ct,t′(n,m). When
there is more than one optimal solution at step (1), we select
(pik, p
j
k) uniformly at random from amongst them.
A common choice of element-wise cost is the Euclidean
norm ct,t′(p
i, pj) = (tpi − t
′
pj
)2. However, to improve ro-
bustness to noise on the timestamp values (in addition to
misalignment of their indices), following [7] we instead use
the following element-wise cost
ct,t′(p
i, pj) = (Dt(p
i)−Dt′(p
j))2 (3)
n
m
j
i
1
1
Fig. 3: Illustrating a warping path. The dashed lines indicate
the warping window.
where Dt(i) =
(ti−ti− )+(ti+−ti− )
2 , i
− = max{i − 1, 1} and
i+ = min{i + 1, |t|}. Observe that Dt(i) is akin to the
derivative of sequence t at index i. Further, we constrain
the warping path to remain within windowing distance w
of the diagonal (i.e. within the dashed lines indicated on
Figure 3) by setting C(p) = +∞ for paths p ∈ P lmn for
which |pik − p
j
k| > max{wmin{n,m}, |m − n|} for any
k ∈ {1, · · · , l}.
Figure 4b illustrates the alignment of points between two
sequences obtained using this approach and for comparison
Figure 4a shows the corresponding result when using Eu-
clidean cost. The figure shows the warping paths on the right-
hand side and an alternative visualisation of the mapping
between points in the sequences on the left-hand side. Observe
that when Euclidean cost is used the warping path tends to
assign many points on one curve to a single point on the
other curve. In comparison, use of the derivative distance tends
to mitigate this effect and select a warping path with fewer
horizontal and vertical sections.
B. F -Distance Measure
Given two timestamp sequences, the warping path is a
mapping between them. With reference to Figure 3, sections of
the warping path which lie parallel to the diagonal correspond
to intervals over which the two sequences are well matched.
Sections of the warping path that are parallel to the x- or y-
axes correspond to intervals over which the two sequences are
poorly matched. This suggests using the fraction of the overall
warping path which is parallel to the x- or y-axes as a distance
measure, which we refer to as the F -distance.
In more detail, let p = {(pik, p
j
k)}, k = 1, · · · , l be a
derivative DTW warping path relating timestamp sequences
t and t′, obtained as described in the previous section. We
partition the warping path into a sequence of subpaths within
each of which either pik or p
j
k remain constant and we count
the subpaths which are longer than one. For example, for
the setup shown in Figure 5 there are five subpaths: (1, 1);
(2, 2), (2, 3); (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 4); (6, 5); (7, 6). Two of these
subpaths consist of more than one pair of points, namely
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Fig. 4: Example DTW alignment and warping paths between
two sequences vs cost function ct,t′ used, window w = 0.1.
In this example the length l of the warping path is 73 when a
Euclidean cost is used and 54 with the derivative cost.
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Fig. 5: Illustrating method for calculating the F -distance
between two timestamp sequences.
(2, 2), (2, 3) and (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 4), and these correspond,
respectively, to the vertical section and the horizontal section
on the corresponding warping path shown in Figure 5b.
Formally, define κ1 := 0 < κ2 < · · · < κr−1 < κr := l
such that for each s = 1, · · · , r − 1 (i) either pik1 = pik2
∀k1, k2 ∈ {κs + 1, · · · , κs+1} or p
j
k1
= pjk2 ∀k1, k2 ∈
{κs + 1, · · · , κs+1} and (ii) either κs+1 = l or condition
(i) is violated for some k1, k2 ∈ {κs, · · · , κs+1 + 1} i.e.
each subsequence is maximal. Note that pik 6= p
j
k for all
k = 1, · · · , l (due to warping path step-wise constraints) and
so in condition (i) it is not possible for both pik and pjk to be
constant. We are now is a position to define the F -distance
measure between timestamp sequences t and t′, namely:
φ(t, t′) :=
∑r−1
s=1(κs+1 − (κs + 1)
n+m
(4)
where κs, s = 1, · · · , r are the constant subsequences in
minimal warping path p∗(t, t′). It can be seen that φ(p) takes
values in interval [0, 1], and is 0 when sequences t and t′ are
identical (in which case the warping path p lies on the diagonal
in Figure 3). For the example in Figure 5 the F -distance φ(p)
is (2 + 3)/13 = 0.385.
IV. DE-ANONYMISING WEB FETCHES OVER TOR
In this section we present measurements of web page
queries carried out over Tor and evaluate the accuracy with
which the web page being fetched can be inferred using only
packet timing data. The dataset consists of 100 fetches of the
home pages of each of the top 20 Irish health and the top 20
Irish finance websites as ranked by www.alexa.com under its
Regional/Europe/Ireland category in September 2014, yielding
a total of 4000 individual web page fetches. The web pages
were fetched during September 2014. A watir-webdriver
script on Firefox 21.0 was used to perform the web page
fetches and tcpdump to record the timestamps and di-
rection (uplink/downlink) of all packets traversing the first
hop connecting the client to the network although only
packet timestamps on the uplink were actually used. The
watir-webdriver script configures Firefox 21.0 to use
the most recent Tor v0.2.4.23 plugin downloaded from the
Tor project repository.
A. Hardware/Software Setup
The client machine is a 3.00 GHz Core 2 Duo CPU with
2GB of RAM and running Ubuntu Linux 12.04 LTS precise.
The client is connected to the network over a gigabit ethernet
LAN and thence to a campus gateway server which also has
a gigabit connection to the Internet.
B. Classifying Measured Timestamp Sequences
We used the F -distance measure φ(·, ·) described in Section
III to compare measured uplink timestamp sequences, with
windowing parameter w = 0.1 unless otherwise stated. A K-
Nearest Neighbours approach was used for classification (use
of a naive Bayes classifier was also investigated, but the K-NN
classifier was found to consistently offer better performance).
In the K-NN classifier, for each web page i we sort the
measured timestamp sequences t′ ∈ Ti used for training in
ascending order of sum-distance
∑
t∈Ti
φ(t, t′) and select the
top 5 to use as exemplars to represent this web page. When
presented with a new timestamp sequence, its distance to the
exemplars for all of the training web pages is calculated and
these distances are sorted in ascending order. Classification is
then carried out by majority vote amongst the top K matches.
C. Randomised Routing
Tor uses randomised routing of traffic over its overlay
network in an attempt to make linking of network activity be-
tween source and destination more difficult. It can be expected
that rerouting will have a significant impact on the timestamp
sequence measured during a web fetch since changes in
path propagation have a direct impact on the time between
an outgoing request and receipt of the corresponding server
response, and also impact TCP dynamics since congestion
window growth slows with increasing RTT. Differences in loss
rate, queueing delay etc along different routes are also likely
to impact measured timestamp sequences.
The impact of Tor rerouting on measured RTT is illustrated
in Figure 6, which plots the mean and max delay between
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Fig. 6: Mean and max RTTs measured during 100 fetches
of the web page www.medicalcouncil.ie. Changes due to Tor
rerouting are evident. The max RTT in (b) is in fact the idle
time between when the last packet is received until the browser
is closed, hence why it is significantly larger than the mean
RTT plotted in (a).
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Fig. 7: Time traces of uplink traffic measured when fetching
www.medicalcouncil.ie . Measurements are shown when using
vanilla Firefox and when using Firefox with the Tor plugin.
sending of a TCP data packet and receipt of the corresponding
TCP ACK for repeated fetches of the same web page (although
this information is not available to an attacker, in our tests
it is of course available for validation purposes). Abrupt,
substantial changes in the mean RTT are evident, especially in
Figure 6b. These changes persist for a period of time as Tor
only performs rerouting periodically.
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of Tor on the packet times-
tamps measured during a web page fetch.
D. Classification Performance
For each of the 40 web pages studied, Figure 8 details the
measured classification accuracy using the K-NN approach.
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Fig. 8: K-Nearest Neighbours classification performance when
using Tor, no browser caching, K = 1.
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Fig. 9: K-Nearest Neighbours classification performance when
not using Tor, no browser caching, K = 1.
We use 10-fold cross validation, where the 100 samples of
each website are divided into 10 random subsets and for each
subset we use the remaining 90 samples as the training data
to find the exemplars and use the 10 samples in the subset
as the validation data. The rates for these 10 subsets for each
website are summarized and displayed in the figure. Each of
the boxes indicate the 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles and the
lines indicate the maximum and minimum values.
The mean success rate is 67.7%. This compares with a
baseline success rate of 2.5% for a uniform random classifier
over 40 web sites and so is likely to represent a significant
compromise in privacy. It also compares favourable with the
54.6% rate reported by Panchenko et al in [11] against Tor
traffic using packet size and direction information.
For comparison, we also created a second dataset by repeat-
ing the 4000 web page fetches without use of the Tor plugin for
Firefox. Figure 9 details the results obtained. Overall, a mean
success rate of 93.0% was obtained. As might be expected, use
of the Tor network significantly reduces classification accuracy
compared to normal network use. The measured performance
without Tor for other parameter settings is also summarised in
Table I.
E. Finding a web page within a sequence of web requests
In the experiments presented so far we have assumed that
within the observed packet timestamp stream the boundaries
6Exemplars w WebPages
K
1 3 5
Tor
3 0.2 40 67.67% 64.55% 63%
3 0.2 20 68% 64.7% 63.3%
3 0.1 20 68% 67.15% 64.55%
Ethernet
5 0.1 40 93.52% 93.87% 93.75%
3 0.1 40 93.03% 92.33% 91.85%
1 0.1 40 90.35% - -
3 0.1 20 93.75% 93.15% 92.65%
TABLE I: Summary of the measured success rate of the
timing-only attack.
between different web fetches are known. This is probably a
reasonable assumption on lightly loaded links where the link is
frequently idle between web fetches. However, not only might
this assumption be less appropriate on more heavily loaded
links but it also allows for a relatively straightforward means
of defence, namely insertion of dummy packets to obscure the
boundaries between web fetches. In this section we therefore
extend consideration to links where web fetches are carried out
in a back to back fashion such that the boundaries between
web fetches cannot be easily identified.
The basic idea is to sweep through a measured stream of
packet timestamps trying to match sections against the timing
signature of a web page of interest. This exploits the fact
that our timing-only attack does not fundamentally depend
on knowledge of the start/end times of the web fetch (unlike
approaches which use packet counts to classify web pages).
In more detail, to locate a target web page within a stream
of packet timestamps we first select three measured packet
timestamp sequences for that web page to act as exemplars (as
previously). Then, we sweep through the stream of timestamps
in steps of 10 packets, extract a section of the stream of
the same length as each exemplar and calculate the distance
between the section and the exemplar. After sweeping through
the full stream we select the location within the stream with
least distance from the exemplars as the likely location of the
target web page within the stream. While this process assumes
that the target web page is present within the packet stream,
we can extend this approach to decide whether the web page
is present by appropriately thresholding the distance (when
the measured least distance is above the threshold, the page
is judged to not be present in the stream) although we do not
include results on this here due to lack of space.
We constructed a test data set as follows. We selected a
subset of 5 web pages from those used previously. We then
selected 3 web pages uniformly at random from this set of
5, selected a permutation of these web pages uniformly at
random and proceeded to fetch the pages in that order over an
ethernet tunnel. We repeated this 100 times, so generating a
dataset consisting of 100 measured packet timestamp streams.
Using the classification approach described above we at-
tempted to identify the location within each packet stream of
one of the web pages (selected uniformly at random from the
set of 3 web pages present in each measured packet stream).
With this approach we achieved a success rate of 69% for
locating the target web page within each packet stream to
within a position error of ±65 packets. Given the limited
information being used, this is a remarkably high success rate
and indicates the power of the timing-only attack.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing
over the first hop - of the Tor network. The attack makes
use only of packet timing information on the uplink and is
therefore impervious to packet padding defences. In addition,
we show that the attack is robust against the randomised
routing used in Tor. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the
attack at identifying the web sites being visited by a Tor user,
achieving mean success rates of 68%. In addition to being
of interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to
highlight deficiencies in existing defences and so to areas
where it would be beneficial for Tor and VPN designers to
focus further attention.
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